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The Rebellion and our Foreign Relations.

REMARKS

HENRY J. RAYMOND,

SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY,

ON THE

Conduct of our Foreign Affairs and the Action and Disposition
of European Powers.

In Assembly, State of New York, Mar. 5, 1862.

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R E M A R K S .

In Committee of the Whole, on Wednesday evening, March 5, the Bill providing for an appropriation of five millions of dollars, and the raising, arming and equipping of one hundred thousand men, to protect the frontiers of the State of New York against invasion, coming up for discussion,

Mr. RAYMOND, of New York City, spoke substantially as follows:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I desire to make some remarks upon the bill before the committee. I do not know whether I can promise that those remarks shall be brief, or very rigidly confined to the specific provisions of the act under discussion; for the debate has taken a very wide range, though not wider, perhaps, than the suggestions, if not the provisions, of the bill itself would warrant. The title of the bill,—“An Act to provide for the public defence,”—is one which of itself commends the bill very strongly to the loyalty and patriotism of every member of this House; and if any member shall be led to oppose it, I am certain that the reason for such hostility will not be found in the general objects which that bill presents, but in some of the specific provisions by which those objects are to be attained. Most surely, sir, I am one of the first and foremost, and trust I always shall be so, not only to concede, but to claim, that our country shall be at all times in a position for adequate defence against foes, foreign or domestic. There is no maxim that has been more honored, or is more worthy of honor, than this, that—“In time of peace we must prepare for war.” We must have fortifications and troops,—munitions of war,—an organized army, and a sufficient navy; and if at any time we are deficient in these preparations for national defence, it becomes us at once, without hesitation, to remedy that deficiency. Whatever of this sort, however, is required, should not be done in so ostentatious a manner as to invite hostility or seem like menace; nor should it be so done as to impose excessive burdens upon the People for whose protection it is designed. But we should have, in every case,

and at all times, adequate and full preparation for every probable emergency of the future.

I concede that the remarks already made upon this subject, the facts brought to the knowledge of the House, especially in the able speech of the gentleman from Ulster (Mr. PIERCE), as well as in the further remarks of the gentlemen from St. Lawrence and Clinton, do establish this point, that our country is *not* adequately provided for defence. I think no one can claim, in the light of the information submitted to this committee, that we are fully prepared for the possible, or even for the probable, emergencies that the future has in store for us. I think, therefore, that this defect should be remedied, promptly and effectually. Our frontier should be put in a position of perfect and complete defence; and the General Government should do it. The duty is explicitly devolved upon the General Government by the Constitution to raise and support armies, to suppress insurrection, to maintain a navy, to repel invasion, and to make all preparations that may tend to make its action in war effective. It is, therefore, the duty of the General Government to put the northern frontier of the United States in a state of defence; not alone the frontier of New York, but that of the entire Republic. The General Government should make these defences sufficient to meet all the probable emergencies of the immediate future; and I am happy to be able to say that the government of the United States has taken the preliminary steps towards this end, and is engaged in preparing a bill embodying the necessary appropriations. In addition to what is known from other sources, accessible to the public at large, it may not be

improper for me to state that I saw to-day an influential member of the Committee of Ways and Means in the House of Representatives, and he told me that a bill was nearly ready and would soon be presented for the consideration of Congress, and be pressed through with all possible dispatch, which provides for prompt and effective action on the part of the General Government in regard to frontier defences. If they seem to us, however, likely to be negligent or dilatory in making these provisions, then it is our privilege, and even our duty, to urge upon them the importance of speedy action, and to insist that they shall neglect it no longer. It is for us to address them, not only concerning the wants of our own state—though upon that point we may speak with authority—but we may call upon them to put the entire Republic in a position of defence and preparation against whatever contingencies may threaten us; and furthermore, it is our duty to give them, in this undertaking, all the aid they may require, in money or in credit, to the extent of our ability. This we should do: and especially where the specific interests of our own state require it, should we do it promptly and without hesitation.

But this is not all which this bill proposes. If I understand its provisions, it goes much further than this. As originally reported by the Committee on Militia and Public Defence, it provides that the State of New York shall proceed forthwith to *arm herself*,—to put herself, as a State, in an attitude and position of defence against invasion,—that she shall build forts upon her frontiers and arm them,—that she shall forthwith enrol and discipline an army of a hundred thousand men, and purchase a hundred thousand stand of arms, by way of preparation for the contingency of war. In a word, Sir, the bill provides that the State of New York shall act in this matter substantially as if she were an independent, sovereign nation,—clothed with power to declare and make war, and thrown upon her own resources for defence in the event of war. That is the spirit of the bill. That is the legitimate character and tendency of its provisions. True, it contains provisions looking toward co-operation with the General Government; but the lead is still left with the State,—the general drift of the bill is in the direction I have indicated. Indeed, the bill looks very much as if it had been framed with reference,

more or less direct, to the possible contingency that the State of New York might find herself under the necessity, or might be tempted into the policy, of proclaiming her independence of the Union, and of standing aloof from her sister states. I could not help, when I first read this bill, recalling some very ominous sentences which had fallen from the lips of gentlemen, not in this hall alone, but elsewhere also, concerning what it might become the duty of this State to do in case we should fail to suppress the rebellion now raging against the General Government. I have never heard such remarks without the deepest regret,—for I have never allowed myself to believe, or for an instant to concede, that it could, in any emergency, become necessary for the State of New York to think of independence or of making, to use language held on this floor at the outset of the session, such arrangements for herself alone as circumstances might require. I will not permit myself under any emergency which can now be deemed probable to contemplate such a contingency as that. I shall oppose everything that looks towards it, for I can conceive of nothing more hostile to the spirit which should animate us,—nothing more hostile to the true welfare of the country, than the sentiment that underlies such admissions, however unconsciously to those who make them. I oppose everything that tends, directly or remotely, to weaken the spirit or the sentiment of nationality in any State of this Union,—most of all in our own State. I see more and more clearly every day that it is this sentiment alone,—the sentiment of a common Constitution, a common Union, one common bond of loyalty, and one common basis for national honor and renown,—that can carry us safely through the perils which now surround us. I cling to this sentiment, more and more, the more it is imperiled. [Applause.] We have had some severe lessons upon this subject,—lessons which should teach us wisdom. It is no time unduly to exalt state rights and state sovereignty now; least of all in this section of the Union. The great trouble of our nation to-day comes from this very source, the attempt of individual states to assume for themselves the sovereign right to act independently of the general government which includes them all, and gives them all their real glory. The doctrine of state rights—distorted from its

real meaning and raised to a position of hostility to the Union, lies at the basis of the conspiracy which has plunged us into this disastrous war. It is, indeed, the very egg out of which this rebellion has been hatched.

While, therefore, I desire as ardently as any man to see New York put in a position of defence, I desire it for her as one of the United States. I do not desire it for her as having an interest in this particular separate from that of Vermont, or Maine, or Michigan, or any of the other States that are equally exposed. Whatever is done for the defence of one State, should be done for the defence of all. It is our interest as a nation and not as a state that is here to be protected, and therefore I look to the general government for that protection. I would call upon that government to do whatever may be necessary under existing emergencies, and proffer to that government whatever aid she may require.

This, I think it will be conceded by all who hear me, is the correct doctrine upon this subject. As a general rule, it is not for individual states to fortify their own frontiers against invasion. But it is said, on the other side, that this rule, however sound, may and must be waived in the presence of great emergencies—that under such overruling emergencies, we may lose sight, for the time being, of those relations which ordinarily limit our action as a state—that when we are involved in special peril, we may decide for ourselves and act independently of the General Government. The law of self-preservation, it is said, requires this, and the Constitution expressly permits it.

Now I am willing, at least for the sake of the argument, to concede this. Indeed, I believe it to be substantially true. But gentlemen who urge this as a reason for passing this bill, will perceive that it throws upon them the entire burden of *proving* the emergency. It must be no conjectural emergency—no peril based on general considerations of possible or even probable events in the indefinite future. It must be an impending peril—one which stares us fully and unmistakably in the face—one so palpable and so great as to admit of no delay. “In case of invasion,” our state Constitution authorizes us to borrow money to meet the danger; but it must be an invasion—not actually upon our soil, I admit—but foreseen, foreknown; not merely conjectured as probable or feared as possible. And the burden of proving affirmatively the existence

of such an impending peril as this, devolves upon those who base upon it their advocacy and support of this bill. Gentlemen have recognized this obligation by endeavoring to fulfill it. They have endeavored to prove that this peril is impending,—that this emergency is really upon us,—nor merely that there is reason to believe that we may be at war with some foreign power, which would be all that is necessary to decide the action of the general government, but that we are in such certain danger of immediate or very near invasion, as to require the *State* to expend five millions of dollars in fortifying her frontiers and in putting her militia upon a war footing. The gentleman from Ulster, Chairman of the Committee on Public Defence (Mr. PIERCE), took this ground very distinctly and pressed it with great force. The gentleman from St. Lawrence (Mr. HULBURD), took the same ground and pushed it still further. He read to the committee elaborate statements in detail of the condition of the several forts which guard New York harbor,—dwelling upon the fact that many of them had not cartridges enough to fire a dozen rounds, and holding forth the idea, even if he did not express it in words, that war was so imminent, that invasion was so close at hand, that we should not have time even to replenish our magazines and cartridge boxes before it would be upon us. The gentleman from Clinton (Mr. STETSON) took the same ground, and carried the idea that even before this bill could pass, there was danger of invasion from our northern neighbors.

Mr. STETSON.—I did not state any such thing, nor did I intend to convey any such idea.

Mr. RAYMOND.—I spoke, I confess, rather of the general drift of the gentleman's remarks than of any specific language which he employed. If the intention is disclaimed, I certainly accept it and owe the gentleman an apology.

Mr. STETSON.—I simply drew a parallel between what might be the state of things, as I viewed it in case of an invasion in the present condition, and the state of things supposed, in such an event, by the gentleman from Onondaga. I had no such thought or apprehension in my mind as the gentleman from New York imputes to me. [Other gentlemen, referred to, made similar disclaimers in their seats, saying that they had not intended to represent the danger of invasion, as imminent.]

Mr. RAYMOND.—Well, then, if gentlemen really believe that there is no such impending danger, that there is no such imminent emergency, they abandon the only ground on which this bill can possibly be defended. [Applause and laughter.] I can not think that they intend thus at the very outset to throw it overboard, after all the arguments and rhetoric they have expended in its support. I certainly can not be mistaken in saying that the leading object of every member who has spoken in defence of this bill, has been to show that we were in imminent danger of a war with England, and that this danger was so great as not only to justify, but require this State to arm herself instantly for defence, without awaiting the action of the federal government. That, I am sure, will not be denied or disavowed; and I proceed, therefore, to inquire whether gentlemen have succeeded in establishing that point. Have they demonstrated the existence of such an emergency? Have they shown that war between the United States and Great Britain is so certain, so imminent, as to demand that the State of New York should take the steps proposed in this bill?

If we are to have war with Great Britain, sir, that war must arise from one of these three facts:

(1.) Either there is some open, unsettled controversy between the two nations which diplomacy can not adjust, in which arbitration will not be accepted, and which can only be settled by an appeal to arms;—or,

(2.) England must intend speedily to declare war against us;—or,

(3.) We must intend speedily to declare war against her. Unless war arises from one of these causes,—unless there is reason to believe that it will arise speedily, immediately, instantly almost, from one of these three causes, the existence of the alleged emergency is not proved. The case is not made out. Now, how is it? Let me examine each point in its proper order.

I. *Is there any unsettled dispute pending between the two countries?* If so, will any gentleman be good enough to name it? Have not all our differences been so far adjusted as to remove them from the contending diplomacy of the two countries? Have they not been settled amicably, and more or less satisfactorily to both sides? Gentlemen say, that in all of these settlements, Great Britain has gained the advantage over us. I am not disposed to concede this, for I do not believe the American statesmen who have nego-

tiated these treaties, to be so far inferior to the English diplomats engaged, in ability or in patriotism, as always to have been worsted in the encounter. I believe that in all our diplomacy we have fully held our own. And I am confirmed in this belief by the fact that precisely the same complaints are made on the other side. In Parliament, regularly at every session, the charge is brought forward that England has been cheated of her rights by the American diplomats, or that she has been forced to yield to the arrogance of American pretensions. You remember the famous fiction of the red-line map by which, it is contended even to this day in England, the Americans deceived the English into the abandonment of a portion of their Maine frontier. Now these complaints on each side against the other carry with them a very strong presumption that both are without any just foundation, or else that both have just enough of truth in them to nullify each other.

But whatever the facts may be in this regard, the treaties are signed and ratified, and they have removed wholly from the arena of national controversy, the differences to which they relate. Whether the advantage be on one side or the other, there is in that fact not the slightest occasion or pretext for war. Even if the reciprocity treaty with Canada be so wholly one-sided, so exclusively for the benefit of Canada, as my friend from St. Lawrence (Mr. REDINGTON) describes it, which, however, I do not think to be really the case, he will not pretend for a moment that it affords the slightest ground for war, or that it justifies the least apprehension that it may give rise to war. There is no “emergency” in that treaty, whatever relative advantages it may confer upon us or our neighbors. The Trent affair—the latest and most formidable of the difficulties which have threatened to disturb our peace—is also settled, upon terms which I need not criticise now, though I shall have occasion to do so at a subsequent stage of these remarks, if the patience of the committee holds out—but which have at least closed the controversy and put an end to what was then truly an impending peril. I think, Sir, that no gentleman will question the truth of the remark when I say, that so far as controverted claims are concerned, our diplomatic record with Great Britain is clearer, more free from sources of immediate collision than it has been for many years.

But it is said England may break our blockade. True: and when she does, *then* we shall be in danger of war. But she has not done it yet. She does not even threaten to do it; nor can I find in her official acts and declarations, any evidence or indication of an intention to break it. Nay, sir, all the evidence that is accessible to us, (for the correspondence has not yet been published,) points directly the other way. It shows that she has steadily resisted all attempts to induce her to break it, either by her own distressed people or by emissaries of the rebel states. She has refused to yield to any pressure, and has declared her purpose to respect the blockade so long as it is effectively maintained; and that is all we have any right to ask of her. You will remember that when at the close of last November, Mr. YANCEY and his colleagues represented to Earl RUSSELL that, for strong reasons of justice and of interest, England should not tolerate the blockade, he was met by the refusal to hold official intercourse with him on any subject whatever. You remember that when a deputation of the Liverpool ship-owners waited upon Earl RUSSELL, urging the injury which the blockade was inflicting upon British commerce, as a reason why it should no longer be respected, they were met by the refusal to consider such a reason as entitled to a moment's weight against the requirements of justice and international law. You will remember, too, that when within a very few weeks, Mr. MASON stated to Lord RUSSELL that more than 600 vessels had run the blockade, and that this fact furnished conclusive evidence that it was not effectively maintained, and was not therefore entitled to be respected, he was asked to give the size and tonnage of the vessels, and when he confessed his inability to do this he was told that this was a most important circumstance, as the great majority of these vessels might have been mere shallop that could pass from one port to another through the creeks and small arms of the sea, and were not restricted by the blockade at all. And, when still more recently, a member called on the British government to lay upon the table the names of all the British vessels that had broken the blockade, with a view to found upon this return a motion that the blockade be disregarded, he was met by the refusal of the government to give the names of its own subjects who had violated the laws of a friendly power, or to permit their mis-

conduct to be made the basis of imperial action. I do not cite these instances to show that England has pursued a course intentionally friendly to us in this contest,—but to prove, as in my judgment they do prove, a disposition and a determination on her part, not to break the blockade so long as it is maintained effectively, in conformity with the requirements of international law. We have no right to ask or expect England or any other nation to do more than this. We, of all nations in the world, cannot possibly assert the validity of a paper blockade. From the very beginning of our history to the present day, we have held that a blockade must be effective,—must be maintained by an effective and adequate force, in order to be entitled to respect.

But it is said again, England threatens to recognize the Southern Confederacy. Well,—if she should *do* that, as well as threaten it, war would be imminent. It might be imminent enough to justify the passage of this bill. But it is only fair to remember that she has not done it,—that she has not even threatened to do it, but that on the contrary, she has refused, steadily and firmly, to make any such acknowledgment. She has thus far adhered to the settled rule of international law, that no nation is entitled to the recognition of her independence until it has been *de facto* established, and until she has proved, by actual success, her ability to maintain it. This is the rule for us and for all nations. England has declared her purpose in this instance to abide by it, and thus far she has done so. And furthermore, sir, up to the present time, she has declared that the Southern Confederacy has not fulfilled this condition of her recognition. In his reply of August 24, to the long and elaborate argument made by the rebel emissaries in favor of recognition, Lord RUSSELL met the whole question by the decisive declaration, that

"Her Majesty will strictly perform the duties which belong to a neutral. Her Majesty cannot undertake to determine by anticipation what may be the issue of the contest, nor can she acknowledge the independence of the nine States which are now combined against the President of the United States until the fortune of arms or the more peaceful mode of negotiation shall have more clearly determined the respective positions of the two belligerents."

And this has been repeated by the government even down to the present time, in the face of the disaster of Bull Run, and in spite of the protracted and wearisome inactivity of our own armies. And what is quite as much to the purpose and even more important, the leader of the

opposition in the House of Lords, the Earl of DERBY, who would naturally sympathize with those who suffer from and censure the action of the government, has still more recently made a similar declaration. I see by the New York Times of this morning that when he rose, only a fortnight since, to correct an erroneous report of remarks he had made on a previous occasion, he used this language:

"I am represented as having said nearly the opposite of what I stated in reference to the recognition of the Southern States. The report is that 'I think the time has nearly come when the Government may probably be called on to recognize the so far successful revolt of the seceded States.' *What I said was that the time has not come when it can properly be called on to recognize the Government representing the successful revolt of the Southern States.* I added that, though it is the practice to recognize a *de facto* Government that has succeeded in establishing itself, *I did not think that the resistance of the Southern States had been so successful as to justify us in recognizing them as a Power able to maintain its own independence.*"

And this was said, sir, before news of the recent victories of the Union armies had reached England, and when there was much in the state of things here, as a distant observer might view it, to encourage the belief that the southern rebellion could not be subdued. Neither the Earl RUSSELL nor Lord DERBY knew anything of the rout of the rebels at Roanoke island, or of the fall of Fort Henry, the conquest of Fort Donelson by storm, and the capture of 15,000 rebel prisoners, the surrender of Nashville, the evacuation of Columbus, or any of the glorious incidents which have so electrified the heart of the nation, and left England and the world still less excuse for believing in the fact or the probability of southern independence. If they took this ground then, is it not much more certain that they will adhere to it now?

Now, Mr. Chairman, I think I have shown that there is no probability of war with Great Britain growing out of any dispute now pending between the two powers,—nor from any action which the British Government has taken or is likely to take in regard to breaking the blockade or recognizing the Southern Confederacy. I can find in none of these matters any proof, or indication even, of such an emergency as would justify the State of New York in arming herself against impending peril. Is there any other question of a threatening character on which the two nations are at issue? If there is I should feel obliged to any gentleman who will name it,—here and now,—for I desire to examine this whole case, and to do it fully and candidly as I go along.

MR. OGDEN: I would like to ask the gentleman from New York, if it will not be an interruption, whether a question may not arise out of the state of affairs in Mexico which may give rise to war?

MR. RAYMOND: I beg to say to my friend from Yates, that this can scarcely be called a *pending* question, giving rise to immediate and overwhelming peril of invasion, even if the differences to which he refers should hereafter arise. I had intended therefore to discuss this Mexican question under another branch of my remarks, and trust the gentleman will allow me to defer my answer to his inquiry until then. I beg also to say that I do not regard questions or suggestions, as to what I may say, as interruptions, if they are pertinent and seem to be called for. I do not deprecate, I rather invite them.

II. I come now to the second alleged cause of an apprehended war: *Will England attack us?* Is there any prospect,—any evidence,—any reasonable probability that she intends to do so? It is said that she envies our prosperity,—that she hates our institutions,—that she fears our growing power and commercial rivalry,—that she would gladly see us crippled, and that she will take advantage of our domestic dissensions to strike a blow which shall humble our pride and destroy our power. I am willing to concede the truth of very much of this. I believe the ruling classes of England at once dislike and dread the ideas which lie at the basis of our government, and that her people envy our freedom from many of the evils under which they groan,—the social equality of our citizens, the absence of privileged and ruling classes, an exemption from heavy and oppressive taxation, an exemption, however, which I fear may not long exist to excite their envy. Granting all this, however, to its fullest extent, it will scarcely be contended that it threatens us with danger of impending war. There are very many other considerations to be taken into the account before we can infer that her envy of us will lead her to make war upon us. She will scarcely lighten the burdens of her own people by plunging into a war which may increase ours. Nor is she likely to make war upon us for the purpose, or in the hope, of converting us to faith in her form of government, or of disgusting her own people with ours.

It seems to me that those who reason thus mistake the character of the English people, and do

not rightly appreciate the temper and spirit of the age. I do not suppose that the era of universal peace is at hand. Nations, evidently, are not ready to beat all their spears into pruning-hooks; but there has certainly been a great advance in regard to the causes and objects of great wars within the last fifty or sixty years. Wars for mere conquest,—for the mere lust of land, or the mere pleasure of extended rule, are much rarer than they used to be: and wars for the propagation of monarchical ideas seem to me to belong wholly to the past. No nation, in my judgment, is likely soon again to wage a great war for the extension of monarchy, or for the extirpation of democratic sentiments and aspirations. England certainly will never be insane enough to plunge into war with the United States for such a purpose or with such a hope. She had a lesson on this subject in her great war with France, waged to crush out democracy in that country, which will prevent her from ever making the same attempt again. That great war, which deluged the whole of Europe in blood, and which sought to impose upon France a rule which her people hated, ended in planting the democratic idea so deeply in the French heart that under some form or other it has ever since ruled that country, and even now lies at the base of the democratic despotism which wields the power and represents the will of the forty millions of her people. War waged against a republic always propagates republican ideas. The very attempt of England to break down our republican institutions would revolutionize England herself. I do not say that *any* war between England and the United States would have this effect. But I do say, that any war waged against us for the avowed or evident purpose of overthrowing our form of government, and replacing it by monarchy or placing us at the mercy of monarchical powers, would revolutionize England in sixty days. No ministry could stand such an issue for an hour; and if it should be made, the throne itself would not survive its trial. No English army, with such an object, could march a hundred miles into our country without losing half its numbers by desertion and the rest by surrender. When Mr. SEWARD proposed to permit British troops to cross the State of Maine on their way to Canada, what was the explanation of the English

and Canadian press? They charged him with seeking to bring British troops upon American soil knowing that they would desert! They interpreted the motive by the result which they knew would follow the act.

My friend from Ulster (Mr. PIERCE), insisted that the distress into which the laboring classes of England have been plunged by this war, will compel the government to break the blockade, or take some other step which will lead to war. He drew a very graphic and, I fear, a very just picture of the suffering which this war has brought upon the classes who lived by their labor upon the raw material of which this war has deprived them. That suffering is intense, and is wide-spread. But it has not deprived either the government or the people themselves of their judgment and common sense. Both know perfectly well that any such remedy as the one proposed would only aggravate infinitely the evils it is intended to cure. It would add the pressure of war, the burdens of war, the horrors, the griefs, the paralysis upon industry which war inflicts, to the loss of employment which the English people now sustain. It would increase the price of bread, while it diminished the ability to pay for it. There is not, therefore, in my judgment, the slightest reason to suppose that England will seek a war with us from any such motive as the one alleged. On the contrary, that motive makes peace her true policy, and we have every reason to believe that she will pursue it.

We must look elsewhere for a clue to the probable policy of the English government. Colonies have ceased to be valuable to England as tributaries to her wealth, and are now little more than burdensome jewels in her imperial diadem. Canada, to which she has been forced to concede nearly all the privileges of self-government, involves her every year in actual expense, and the same thing is true of nearly all her colonies. The only advantage which she now derives from her colonial possessions is the privilege of trading with them on terms of advantage. Indeed, the great want of Great Britain at the present day is *markets*,—customers. Her agriculture has become a secondary interest. Commerce and manufactures rule her policy and shape her laws. It was this rapid growth of her manufacturing system and the necessity of fortifying her commercial power

that led her to adopt free trade. She owes her prosperity now to the fact that she is at once the work-shop and the carrier for the world. What she needs above all things, therefore, is easy access to the markets of the world. What she seeks from the United States is not their conquest, not the overthrow of their institutions, but the privilege of supplying their people with her manufactured goods. If she can fill our cities and villages, and supply the farm-houses and thriving towns of the mighty west with her wares, the products of the industry of her people, receiving in exchange the provisions which they need for their support, her own greatness and prosperity are secured. Whatever interferes with her plans for doing this, inflicts serious damage upon her interest, and serious suffering upon her people.

This fact explains to my mind her discontent,—her indignant resentment, at our rebellion, and explains the course she has pursued in regard to it. With an Englishman, England's interest is the supreme law. He judges all the acts of all other nations, not in the least by their intrinsic equity, but by their bearing on the welfare of England. That shrewd observer and most accurate judge of the peculiarities of national character, M. de TOCQUEVILLE, remarked, with perfect truth, in one of his charming letters to an English friend, that “in the eye of an Englishman a cause is just, if it be the interest of England that it should succeed. The criterion of what is honorable, great or just, is to be found in the degree of favor or of opposition to English interests.” When this rebellion first broke out, England saw that it would interrupt her trade with this country, cut off her supplies of cotton, and plunge a large portion of her people into poverty and distress. She was indignant at the whole country for permitting a rebellion attended with such results to occur. It was for her interest that the war in America should cease, and she pursued that course which she thought most likely to bring about that result. Looking at the matter from a distance, and without the slightest regard to the justice of the case, she believed that we could not subdue the South, and that the only way by which peace could be restored and her trade resumed was for the United States to let the revolted States alone. She, therefore, favored this policy—urging it through all her organs of opinion and of influence, and substantially espousing, actually though un-

officially, the cause of Southern independence, not from any special sympathy with the South, nor from any special hatred to the North, but from a profound regard to her own interest and a sincere desire for the suspension of the war and the resumption of her trade with both sections of the United States. What she sought from the outset, and what she seeks still, is the speediest possible termination of the war, for the sake of her own commerce and manufactures. She has favored the South hitherto because she believed that the war would be soonest ended in that way. When she sees that the South is losing ground, and that the North is gaining,—she will see that the end of the war will be sooner reached by the triumph of the government; and then, from precisely the same motives that influenced her before, her sympathies will be on the other side.

But nothing can be more preposterous than to imagine that she will ever seek to end the war by taking part in it herself. As my friend from St. Lawrence (Mr. REDINGTON) remarked, the English are not an ignorant people, nor is her government in the hands of stolid men. They know that their active participation in the contest in any way, and especially as an enemy of the United States, would only prolong the war indefinitely. There is not the slightest reason, in my judgment, to anticipate such a proceeding on her part. We are a comparatively young nation—strong in material resources, stronger in self-confident reliance upon our strength; just fitting ourselves by the discipline of this war for such a struggle as England's active hostility would bring upon us. Does she not know that in such a contest all the advantage would be on our side—that whatever might be the damage she could inflict upon us at the beginning, every blow she might strike would only render impossible the termination of the war until it had been fully repaid? Is she mad enough to suppose that by attacking and seizing our ports by destroying the city of New York, by blockading our harbors, by making predatory and destructive incursions upon our frontiers, she would put an end to the war which interrupts her commerce and throws her laboring population out of employment? No, sir. She knows very well that such a war thus begun would never end until one country or the other had exhausted its resources and received a death-blow.

to its prosperity. And she knows, moreover, which of the two would be the most likely to incur that fate—an old country, pressed already by an enormous debt, surrounded by watchful and jealous powers upon her own continent, separated by three thousand miles from her enemy, and having in her bosom a large and powerful element of sympathy with our institutions—or a young people, rich, haughty, tenacious and proud, fighting at their own threshold, and animated by ambitions and hopes that England has long survived. Such a contest would be one of madness, and there is no statesman, no leading man of any party in England, that dare provoke it.

But my friend from Clinton (Mr. STETSON) made the inquiry of my colleague (Mr. PHELPS), the other day, "What means this sending of troops to Canada?" and the gentleman from St. Lawrence (Mr. HULBURD) referred, in proof of the warlike intentions of England, to the fact that military guards had been stationed at the locks of her Canadian canals, and that upon some of those locks these guards have been lately doubled. Well, sir, that does not seem to me a very threatening incident. So far as it proves anything, it indicates to my mind that Canada fears invasion from us, rather than that she has any intention of invading us. I doubt, however, whether it has one whit more importance than the fact that military guards have been pacing up and down in front of our arsenal at Troy, for the last twenty years. It indicates an intention simply to protect by military vigilance the military property of the province. And if the gentleman from Clinton will permit me to answer the question which he asked my colleague, in regard to the object of sending troops to Canada, I will say that I believe it to have been mainly, if not wholly, a defensive measure.

Mr. STETSON:—Does my friend believe that it had any connection with the Trent affair?

Mr. RAYMOND:—Unquestionably, it had a very direct connection.

Mr. STETSON:—There its meaning was *war*, unless we yielded to the demands of Great Britain in regard to the affair.

Mr. RAYMOND:—Undoubtedly. That was precisely its meaning. So long as those demands were not responded to, there was danger of war. But they were yielded, and then the danger dis-

appeared. As to the merits of that particular question I shall have more to say hereafter. But it will be remembered that troops had been sent to Canada long before the Trent affair, immediately indeed upon the outbreak of our rebellion. Our minister in London, under instructions from the government at Washington, asked explanations. Earl RUSSELL replied to Mr. ADAMS that it was intended, not in the least as a menace, but as purely a precautionary measure. He represented that in the midst of such a war as disturbed the United States, it was impossible to say how far British interests might be affected;—that movements of sympathy with one party or the other might occur in Canada: that these might be resented from the other side; and that it was deemed wise in this, as in all similar cases, to send a force sufficient to protect the interests and preserve the neutrality of the Canadian frontier.

Mr. STETSON:—If that was a wise policy for them, with regard to contiguous territory, I beg to ask why it is not a wise policy for us also?

Mr. RAYMOND:—It is the best policy in the world. It is precisely the policy which I trust the General Government will adopt. It certainly belongs to that government to adopt it; and the emergency which it supposes is not such as to demand a departure from usage or warrant the interposition of the State.

Mr. PIERCE:—We have been waiting for the General Government to do that very thing now for years, but in vain. She seems now as she always has seemed utterly insensible to the momentous dangers to which we are exposed. Three years ago, when war seemed impending, we called on her for aid, but she refused it. Two years ago we renewed the call with the same result. One year ago it was again repeated, but nothing whatever was done. It is time now, sir, that the State took the matter into her own hands.

Mr. RAYMOND:—Three years, two years and one year ago, then, we thought we were on the brink of war, and called on the National Government for aid. That government did *not* think we were on the verge of war. I ask my friend from Ulster which of the two proved to be right? [Applause and laughter] May not the same thing be true in the present instance?

Mr. PIERCE:—Congress has remained in session now four months without doing anything for us, and would never have thought of doing anything if the bottom of the Treasury had not been reached. [Laughter.]

Mr. RAYMOND: My friend from Ulster is altogether too impetuous. The instant he foresees or suspects a danger, he would have Congress provide against it. For the past three or four years he has believed we were on the eve of war, and has been patriotically indignant that Congress could not see it. Congress thus far, however, has proved to be right. Now he *knows* the danger is at hand, and is again indignant at the apparent insensibility of the general government to a peril that seems to him so palpable. It is barely possible, he will concede, that he may be again mistaken. At all events he is, to my mind, somewhat too impatient. Great nations, like all great bodies, move slowly. It does not become them to act rashly or under the influence of a panic. If the government believed we were on the verge of war with England or any other power, I believe they would make preparation for such an emergency with all due dispatch. The fact that they move deliberately in the matter, proves to my mind that they do not believe the peril to be so imminent as my friend from Ulster supposes.

Mr. PIERCE: But they did not prepare for war while the Trent affair was pending; and then, the gentleman from New York concedes, there was imminent danger of war.

Mr. RAYMOND: My friend must bear in mind that the government at Washington knows a good deal more about the exact state of our foreign relations than we can know here. That government knew from the beginning, what we did not, that all danger of war could and would be averted by yielding to the demand of Great Britain in regard to the Trent affair. Therefore it was that they did not deem preparation for war at all essential. They knew that the difference would be arranged without an appeal to arms, and on that account they did not deem it necessary to plunge into hasty and undignified preparations for hostilities. I think the event shows that, in this as in the other instances referred to, the government was right.

Now a word more in regard to the point of which I was speaking when these interruptions occurred—the motives of England in sending troops to Canada. Her apprehension of possible disturbance along the frontier seem to me not to have been unreasonable. We were in the first flush of our first military demonstrations on a large scale. For the first time in our

history we saw five or six hundred thousand men in arms upon our soil, and under our flag. We were naturally enough a little excited by the sight of so many bayonets. We were dazzled by our unaccustomed epaulettes. The military spirit of the country was beginning to be aroused, and, as will always happen in such cases, it led to some extravagancies of sentiment and of speech. We began to anticipate the hour when the rebellion should be crushed, and when we should sigh for new foes to conquer. The burly and tempting form of John Bull rose in our path, and we began to ponder and to speak of the old accounts we had to settle with him; and some of our loudest and least respectable braggarts of the press dealt largely in ferocious proclamations of the designs we cherished against Great Britain, and of the certainty that they would be carried into effect the moment we should have conquered the Southern rebellion. Indeed, you will remember that it was announced in one of these journals, and pertinaciously repeated, day after day, as from official authority, that the government intended to pick a quarrel with Great Britain as the surest means of re-uniting the North and South in the bonds of Union. It is impossible for any man, not thoroughly acquainted with the statistics of idiocy or the innate and reckless depravity of men who are willing thus to imperil the public peace, duly to appreciate the effect of such mischievous falsehoods. But they had a very marked effect in England. They created there the impression that we were determined upon war with Great Britain. When our great military chieftain, Gen. Scott, returned from Europe, while the Trent affair was pending, he stated expressly that he did so because he believed the two countries were on the brink of war, and that scarcely a man could be found in England who did not think so likewise. I asked him why they thought so: he replied because they believed, one and all, that we were determined upon war, and that we had committed what they styled the Trent outrage as the initial step of such a war. It seems incredible that such an apprehension should take possession of a great and intelligent community. But it will seem less so, if we remember that there is nothing too absurd for nations, or armies, or legislatures, or individuals, to do, when they act under the influence of a panic. Call to mind the panic that prevailed

in England in 1859, during the Italian war, when the Emperor of the French went to the aid of the king of Sardinia in his contest with Austria. Although the emperor had taken every possible precaution to reassure England and all Europe as to his designs, the whole press, the parliament and the great mass of the people of England were absolutely convulsed with the shuddering belief that everything he was doing was merely a preliminary step to his invasion of England. To a stranger on the spot, as I happened to be at the time, the spectacle would have been ludicrous if it had not been humiliating. Even the greatest and best men in England—even so great, so wise, so experienced a man as Lord LYNDHURST—yielded to the contagion, and could not hear with patience any person who doubted that Louis Napoleon would attempt to land on the shores of England within sixty days! When John Bull does get into a panic or a passion, he is a sight worth seeing! His rage is quite as edifying, and is often excited with quite as little reason, as that of any other animal of the same nature or name. [Laughter.]

Now, Sir, I find no difficulty in satisfying my own mind by such considerations as these, that the dispatch of troops to Canada was mainly a defensive and precautionary measure on the part of the English government, and that it does not indicate any intention on the part of Great Britain, of making war upon us, nor does it create any such emergency as would demand or warrant the passage of this bill. Yet I would treat with great respect the opinions of gentlemen who differ from me on this point. I can make great allowance certainly for the somewhat excited sentiments of my friend from Clinton (Mr. STETSON). He lives on the sacred soil of Plattsburgh, where the very air is redolent with memories of heroic sacrifice, and of glorious victories over the English flag. History tells us of an ancient statesman whom the trophies of Miltiades would not let sleep. I can well imagine that the memories of McCOMB and McDONOUGH disturb the waking visions of the gentleman from Clinton. Let me, then, fortify what I have said, by what ought to have weight with him and every other member of this House, the official declaration on this very point of the recognized head of the British government. On the 17th of last month a debate occurred in the House of Commons on this subject.

Mr. BRIGHT arraigned the government for having incurred a needless expense of nearly a million pounds sterling, by sending troops to Canada, when there was no occasion for such a step. Lord PALMERSTON, in reply, rehearsed the history of the Trent affair, quoted the approbation expressed in the United States of the act of Capt. WILKES, and gave many and cogent reasons for the belief which prevailed in England, that the United States government would incur the hazards of a war, rather than surrender the prisoners who had been taken from the Trent. He then added:

"What was considered by the Americans to be our weak point, and what was the circumstance which made the United States always more difficult to deal with by England than by France? It was the thought that *Canada and the British North American Colonies were defenseless.* [Cheers.] What, then, was it our duty to do? It was to strengthen them, and make the Americans see that we were able to defend ourselves on that point which they thought to be the most vulnerable and most easily accessible to them. [Hear, hear.] That was not 'ferocious gesticulations.' [Hear, hear, and laughter.] It was simply a defensive measure—[hear]—it was simply strengthening that part which had been weak and might be attacked, and the knowledge of the weakness of which might induce the Americans to maintain that position which they had up to that moment occupied—to retain these men in prison and refuse to comply with our demand for their restoration. [Hear, hear.] Therefore, so far from Her Majesty's Government being obnoxious to blame, I think that the Government are deserving of commendation for what they did; and, though they performed no more than their duty, they performed it promptly and efficiently, and have met with, I believe, the approbation of the country at large. [Cheers.] I think, then, that the censure of my honorable friend, the member for Birmingham, is not deserved, and that what we did was not at all calculated to provoke the Government of the United States. It was simply a measure which it was our bounden duty to take, seeing the uncertainty of the result of the communications carried out from this country. So far from any feeling of ineradicable irritation between the two countries being engendered by the course pursued, I believe that a contrary course would have produced such a result."

I am aware that it is not always safe to rely implicitly upon official explanations of this kind. But this is so natural,—so thoroughly conformable to the common sense of the case, that I believe it to be sincere. It affords what I regard as a sufficient explanation of the whole matter. It answers the question of my friend from Clinton, and satisfies me that these troops were not sent to Canada with any purpose or thought of invading the United States. Indeed, with all his pluck and recklessness, I do not think John Bull is in the least likely to invade this country with 18,000 men, when he could be met at any point of the frontier he might select with a force four times as large.

Now, sir, I think these reasons sufficient to show that England does not intend to attack us. At all events they show that her purpose of in-

vasion is not so clear and unmistakable as to create the emergency which alone can justify the passage of this bill.

III. I come now to the third branch of these remarks:—*Do we intend to make war upon England?* For this is the only remaining contingency which can make war probable between the two countries. Is there any reason to believe that we have any such intention? Is there any good and solid ground for such a purpose.

Sentiments have been uttered on this floor, and are perhaps somewhat widely cherished elsewhere, which apparently indicate a willingness on our part to invite such an issue. My friend from Ulster [Mr. PIERCE], said that we have old scores to settle with Great Britain—that nothing but our temporary weakness leads us to brook her insolence, and that as soon as we have done with this rebellion we shall punish England for her insults and for her misconduct generally. Now I must say, sir, that I do not like this style of treating grave questions, involving peace or war between two of the greatest powers of the earth. I intend nothing personally offensive, certainly, but it does not seem to me either dignified or worthy of men holding responsible public positions. If we have scores to settle, let us settle them as we go along. If we have insults to resent, let us resent them on the spot, or else forget them. Let us lay up no grudges. If we are too weak to maintain our honor or protect our interest now, let us submit with the dignity of self-respect to our position. This feeling that when we are grown up we will chastise the school-master used to be rather common, I remember, among school-boys: but as we grew older we became ashamed of it, and discovered gradually that we had something else and something better to do. Let us not now, in the grave duties of public life, imitate the follies of our boyish days. Thus far, in our history, we have proved ourselves quite competent to defend our national honor. I have no fears that we shall fall short of it, either in purpose or ability, now.

But, sir, even if this were not so, if there were old scores to be paid off at some future time, I can hardly suppose that the State of New York is to take the lead in this work of *ex post facto* revenge. She need not arm herself in hot haste for such a purpose. That duty, if a duty it be, will devolve upon the general government. I shall be content, and I think this state will be

content, to follow the lead of that government, on such a subject. If our aid is required it will be afforded. But until it is called for, we depart widely from the sphere of our duty in taking action upon such a subject, for such a purpose.

And now I might very well leave this point, with this suggestion. It covers the whole ground and offers, in my judgment, a sufficient reason why this bill should not become a law. But, if I do not trespass too much upon the patience of the committee, I should be glad to examine some of the alleged complaints against Great Britain,—some of the facts cited as laying the foundations for that hostility which can only be satisfied by war. What, then, are these complaints?

I hear a good deal said about England's want of sympathy with us in our attempts to put down the rebellion. She has given us the cold shoulder. In spite of all her pretended dislike of slavery, she has not shown the slightest sympathy with the effort of the government to crush the rebellion which has grown out of the attempt of slavery to maintain, perpetuate and increase its political power. As to the sincerity or hypocrisy of her professed sentiments concerning slavery, England must be her own judge. We are not responsible for her consistency. We have never believed her very sincere and have no right, therefore, to be disappointed when she proves the justice of our distrust. It would have been pleasanter, doubtless, to have had her sympathy, her encouragement, her good wishes, in this day of our calamity. But we can do without them. We are too strong to need them, and we ought to be too proud to complain if they are withheld. Nations, moreover, as such, have no sympathies with other nations. Their relations are those of interest, of mutual respect, but rarely, if ever, of sentiment. What one nation can gain from another by befriending her usually measures the extent of her friendship. Besides, if this were not so, have we any special claim upon England for her sympathy in the present instance? How have we established such a claim? Was it by sympathizing with her when she was at war with Russia, or when she was seeking to put down rebellion in India? Did our sympathies gush forth towards the English government when she sought, a few years since, to trample down a small rebellion in Ireland? Have we ever sympathized with any European power in any such case of contest with rebellion

against its authority? Did we sympathize with Austria when she contended against rebellion in Hungary and in Italy?

Mr. SCHOLEFIELD: I would like to ask the gentleman whether the United States have not sympathized with Italy as against Austria,—with Ireland as against England—whether our sympathies were not with Hungary and with the South American Republics in their struggles for independence?

Mr. RAYMOND: Certainly they were. We have always sympathized with every rebellion against any established government. We sympathized with Ireland and with Canada in their rebellion against Great Britain. And England is only paying us off with a little of our own coin, in sympathizing with those who are in rebellion against us. We are the children of rebellion. We won our own independence by it, and our sympathy goes naturally with every other community engaged in a similar effort.

Mr. REDINGTON: The gentleman does not mean to say that our sympathies go with the southern rebels? [Laughter.]

Mr. RAYMOND: Oh no! Not at all. That is a "horse of another color." It is *our* ox that is gored in this case, and that fact changes essentially the complexion of the whole affair. [Loud laughter.]

We have not had the sympathies of England in this contest, nor can I say that I think we had any fair claim upon them, or any good ground for complaint that they were withheld. Certainly it affords no possible ground for war, or for cherishing such resentments as must of necessity lead to war. All we have a right to demand of any nation in such a case is, that she shall not aid our enemies—that she shall remain neutral. It is alleged, I admit, that England has not done this—that she has in various ways encouraged the rebels in the Southern States; and to a certain degree the charge is true. I think that her moral attitude at all events has been one of encouragement to the rebels, and of consequent unfriendliness to us. I have nothing to say—not the slightest disposition to say anything, in excuse for her conduct in that respect. But I shall say, what I think can be justly said, that, judged by the rules of international law, the government of Great Britain has substantially maintained her position as a neutral power. I do

not see any point on which her conduct can be successfully arraigned at that tribunal.

Mr. PIERCE: How was it in the matter of the Nashville and Tuscarora?

Mr. OGDEN: How in the matter of the stone blockade?

Mr. RAYMOND: I will refer to both these points in their proper order. But let me follow the order of time and speak first of the first of her offences,—the one which excited most resentment throughout this country, and which has seemed to me much less defensible than her action in either of the cases named. I mean the original recognition of the South as a belligerent power,—and the concession to her of belligerent rights. I have always felt that in that act, at the very outset of the war, she gave the rebellion great encouragement, and seemed almost to insult the government of the United States by placing the pretended authorities of the rebel states on a level with us. That certainly was a galling position for us to hold. But it is not well to exaggerate the real meaning of that act on the part of England. It did not establish or intimate any equality between us and the rebels, except what might grow out of the fact that we both were *fighting*, and that we ought to fight on the common basis of a recognized war. We were to meet as equals in rights *there*, but nowhere else. That was all which this act of England implied. She refused then, and has refused ever since, to recognize the South in any other light, or even to hold intercourse with her representatives. It is only fair to remember also that in doing this she acted in concert with France and all the other European powers, and that she saved herself and saved us, from some complications to which otherwise the progress of the war might have given rise, and which might have proved extremely awkward. Suppose, for example, she had not thus recognized them. To whom could she have looked for redress in case one of her vessels had been overhauled by a rebel privateer, but to the government of the United States? Upon whom could she have had any claim for the release of British subjects impressed into the rebel army, but upon the government of the United States? I do not assign this as a sufficient justification for the course which she has pursued. But these are among the things which show that there may be two sides even

to this, which is perhaps the most questionable of all her acts.

And now in regard to the Nashville and Tuscarora. Having recognized the two as belligerent powers, and declared herself neutral as between them, she was bound to extend precisely the same rights and the same privileges to both. The Nashville was duly commissioned by the rebel authorities, so far as they can duly commission anything, as a war vessel; when she came to Southampton she was entitled to the hospitality of the port, precisely as was the Tuscarora or any other vessel of the United States. I believe it is conceded that she received nothing more. She was permitted to repair and refit for sea and to take on board provisions. This the rules of international law permit. But she was not allowed to take on board a single gun, or a single pound of powder or to enlist and ship a single man. At least I have never seen any proof that she was permitted to do any one of these things, or anything else which the requirements of neutrality in such cases prohibit. The hardest thing of all was that when the Nashville left the port, the Tuscarora was forcibly detained from departing to follow her, until twenty-four hours afterwards: and yet I believe that, even in this, England only enforced a rule which is imperative upon all belligerent vessels under such circumstances in a neutral port. That point I think my friend from Clinton [Mr. STETSON], who is much more familiar with such matters than I am, will concede.

Mr. STETSON: I do not dispute it.

Mr. RAYMOND: I believe it has always been recognized and acted upon by our own government. During the war between England and France, while Mr. JEFFERSON was Secretary of State, I think it was distinctly set forth in his letters to M. GENET, the French minister, and that all our public officers were required in circulars issued from the department of state, to see that it was enforced. Even in this affair, therefore, I think my friend from Ulster must concede that the action of England has been conformable to the requirements of international law, and that we cannot, therefore, make it a ground of just complaint.

Mr. PIERCE: She has also refused our vessels the right to visit her ports, except under great restrictions,—which is a courtesy never denied, I believe, to vessels of a friendly power.

Mr. RAYMOND. Nevertheless, it is a courtesy she has a right to withhold, and which we can scarcely blame her for withholding, if conceding it becomes seriously embarrassing, by making her ports or her neutral waters the scene of possible conflict between two belligerents.

Mr. PIERCE. What I intended to say, in my remarks upon this point the other day, was that the affair of the Tuscarora and Nashville has shown the unfriendly spirit of England towards us, and should lead us as a nation to look forward and prepare for emergencies that may be close upon us.

Mr. RAYMOND. I will admit that. I do think the spirit exhibited in that affair was not friendly, and that it should put us on our guard against future contingencies. But does it create such an emergency, is it such a reason, as imposes upon this *state* the necessity of taking such action as this bill proposes?

Mr. PIERCE. Let me ask the gentleman, if there was one chance in a hundred that before this Legislature should meet again, hostilities would break out between us and England, would that be a sufficient reason for our arming for defense, in his judgment?

Mr. RAYMOND—No, sir, not for the state's arming.

Mr. PIERCE—If there was one chance in ten, how would it be?

Mr. RAYMOND—Well, sir, I am not quite prepared to settle the matter on such an arithmetical basis. I should need to cipher a little, perhaps, to give an intelligent answer. But I do not think I should regard even that as a sufficient reason for passing this bill.

Mr. PIERCE—I certainly would; and the difference between the gentleman's patriotism and mine is that, while he hesitates about having the state arm against one chance in ten of an invasion, I would arm against one in a hundred.

Mr. RAYMOND—Well, sir, the gentleman will bear in mind that he has not shown even one chance in a hundred of an invasion from England within the time specified. And if there were one chance in ten, or one in a hundred of such an event, I am quite certain that there are ninety-nine chances in a hundred that the General Government would detect it sooner than either of us, and would be quite as well prepared to meet it; and I should, therefore, prefer leaving it entirely in their hands.

Mr. PIERCE: I think history is against you.

Mr. RAYMOND: I think not. But enough, sir, upon this point. Suffice it to say that for the reasons given, I see nothing in any of these acts which creates such an emergency as this bill contemplates.

I come now to another reason which has been assigned for believing, that we shall ere long declare war against Great Britain. The gentleman from Ulster (Mr. PIERCE), says that we have been *humiliated* and disgraced by the British government, and that our people will not only never submit to such humiliations in the future, but will insist upon revenging and redressing those we have already sustained. The gentleman specified three conspicuous instances of this humiliation at the hands of Great Britain. The first was the Trent affair, which he said "was settled to our humiliation as a people, and that the country would never again submit to such indignity." The gentleman subsequently repeated:

"that the humiliation submitted to in this case was not owing to any sense of inability to cope with our adversary under other circumstances, and at other times, but we were forced to it by the defenseless condition of our harbors and frontiers, and from the fact that our land and naval forces were otherwise engaged." But it would not always be so, and he warned the House and the country to be ready for the charge and the onset when that day should arrive."

Now, sir, I have the honor to say that I differ *toto caelo* from the gentleman on this point. I do not concede the justice of his remarks in a single particular. I believe that, from the beginning to the present time, during this rebellion, the rights of this country have been maintained, and its honor preserved intact, against foreign powers; and in no case more conspicuously than in this very affair of the Trent. I believe, sir, that the action of our government in this instance will form one of the brightest chapters in our national history, and will win for us the admiration of posterity, as it now commands for us the respect and esteem of every nation, and of the world.

What now were the circumstances of that affair? A neutral vessel, bearing the flag of a neutral power, going from one neutral port to another, was boarded by an American man of war, and four persons taken by force from on board of her, brought into port and committed to prison. That was substantially the whole transaction. Let me say here that I sympathized with the whole country in the gallantry and

heroism of the act. I never doubted for a moment that Capt. WILKES acted from the most patriotic motives, and from a sincere belief, in the absence of instructions, that he was doing what he had a perfect right to do under the law of nations. I joined in praising him for it: as a personal and professional act I think he deserved all the praise he received. I rejoiced, moreover, in common with every loyal heart, that these four "*infernal scoundrels*," as my friend from St. Lawrence (Mr. REDINGTON) very justly, but perhaps somewhat strongly, styles them, had been interrupted on their voyage of treason, and had found their proper quarters in Fort Warren. It was comfortable to think that they had found at last their proper place, and the whole country gave itself up for the moment to the satisfaction which that fact inspired.

But we were soon called upon to face quite another aspect of this affair. We were compelled to ask how it stood in the eye of those principles we had always maintained in regard to the rights and immunities of neutral powers. From the beginning of our national career our position had been almost without interruption, that of a neutral. We were remote from the great theatre of wars, and our interest lay largely in liberating commerce from the perils with which war surrounds it. We had always sought, therefore, to enlarge the privileges and exemptions of neutrals. We had always contended for the most liberal interpretation which could possibly be given to international law in this regard. We had insisted that neutral goods on an enemy's ship should be held harmless,—that enemy's goods on a neutral ship should be untouched,—that the neutral flag should cover and protect the cargo. And especially had we insisted, as against Great Britain, and had waged one war with her in support of the claim, that no naval officer should take from on board a neutral ship any person under the protection of its flag, and assume to determine his character, or to dispose of him in any way without due process of law. Great Britain, being a naval power and resting upon her navy as the great bulwark of her strength, resisted these claims and had excluded the principles out of which they grew from the international code. Now, this act of Capt. WILKES was in direct and flagrant violation of the principles for which we had always contended on this very subject. If our government

had sustained it they would have stultified every act of our past history, and would have abandoned, utterly and hopelessly, the attempt to engrave our principles concerning neutral rights upon the code of maritime law.

My friend from St. Lawrence (Mr. REDINGTON), referred in this connection to some articles which appeared in the New York *Times* upon this subject, in which he is pleased to say the action of Capt. WILKES was triumphantly vindicated against the British, and that he hopes I will adhere to the same position now. Now, sir, I read those articles ; and, "not to put too fine a point upon it," I may add that some of them I wrote. And, in the main, so far as I remember them, I still hold to the leading principles which they embraced. When we first heard of the capture of these men, our first sentiment was one of unbounded and unmixed satisfaction. The next was one of inquiry—can Great Britain complain of the act ? That was the question which came up first, and the articles to which the gentleman from St. Lawrence refers, discussed that question and that alone. We found, or thought we found, abundant evidence that, tried by British law and British precedent, the act of Capt. Wilkes was perfectly justifiable ; and the very general verdict of the country was that England could not complain of the act without abandoning her traditional position, and substantially conceding the claims of the United States on the subject of neutral rights. But she did complain. And then our government was compelled to judge the act on American grounds, and to test it by our own principles and precedents. And that, as I have already stated, led to a very different conclusion.

Mr. PIERCE : Did not Congress indorse the act of Capt. Wilkes ?

Mr. PHELPS : Only the House of Representatives.

Mr. RAYMOND : Only one branch of Congress approved it, and that was done far more as a personal compliment to Capt. Wilkes than as a declaration of the principles of international law.

Mr. STETSON : Does the gentleman from New York believe that England acted in conformity with her own principles in the affair of the Trent ?

Mr. RAYMOND : Certainly not. She came for the moment upon our ground,—she conceded *ad hoc* the position we had always held.

Mr. STETSON : Does he not see that this action on her part shows the depth of her hostility ?

Mr. RAYMOND : I do not catch the point of my friend's argument. If he means to say that, because she conceded our ground on the subject of neutral rights, therefore she means to go to war with us, I can only say that he reminds me of the argument embodied in the English couplet—

" My wound is great because it is so small : —
Then it were greater were it none at all." [Laughter.]

Mr. STETSON : The hostile purpose of England was manifest in this, that she made concession of a doctrine she had maintained in order to accomplish her object and find a pretext for war.

Mr. RAYMOND : I must be somewhat muddled this evening, for I cannot see the conclusiveness of my friend's argument, even yet. If she abandoned her own principles in the hope and belief that we would also abandon ours, and go to war for the purpose of proving that we had always been wrong and that she had always been right, the result showed that she was greatly mistaken. But I do not believe that she acted under any such motive. I think she was stung, as we should have been under similar circumstances, by the disregard and desecration of her flag, and that she would have gone to war in vindication of it, had we refused the redress which she demanded, and which we could not refuse without abandoning our own principles and our own position ; and in granting that redress, I think our Government did exactly right.

Mr. PIERCE : If the United States Government had at once made that concession, it would have been all well. Then the United States would have carried out our principles truly. It should have been done at her own instance, if she would claim consistency on the ground of former precedents. But she waited until the British lion showed his teeth, and then she yielded and stultified herself. Did not Mr. SEWARD maintain that Captain Wilkes was right in what he did, if he had only carried it out rightly ? If he had brought the matter before the courts it would have been right.

Mr. RAYMOND—That is substantially Mr. SEWARD's position.

Mr. PIERCE—Then he was right in doing the act, but technically wrong in not complying with the law in regard to such transactions ?

Mr. RAYMOND—Yes, if you choose so to state it. In other words, if Capt. Wilkes had done something entirely different from what he actually did, his action would have been legal and right. [Laughter.]

Mr. PIERCE—His fault was merely technical.

Mr. RAYMOND—All violation of law is, in one sense, merely technical. It is the technicality that makes the law, and a violation of the technicality is a violation of the law. If Capt. Wilkes had sunk the Trent, instead of bringing her into port, he would have technically violated the law. He would have done something which the law forbids, and would not have done something which the law enjoins. That was precisely what he did in this case, and, therefore, his act was in violation of law.

The gentleman from Ulster insists that if our government had corrected the error of its own motion, upon first receiving intelligence of the act, it would have been all right; it could then have done so with honor; but that having failed to do so its subsequent compliance with the demand of the British government was humiliating and degrading. I apprehend the gentleman is not as familiar with the facts of this transaction as he should have been. I beg to remind him that our government did, substantially, what he requires—did all that it could do with propriety at the very outset. In a despatch dated Nov. 30, written immediately after hearing of the affair of the Trent, Mr. SEWARD wrote to Mr. ADAMS as follows:

"Since that conversation [between Lord Palmerston and Mr. Adams] was held, Captain Wilkes, in the steamer San Jacinto, has boarded a British colonial steamer and taken from her deck two insurgents who were proceeding to Europe on an errand of treason against their own country. This is a new incident, unknown to and unforeseen, at least in its circumstances, by Lord Palmerston. *It is to be met and disposed of by the two governments, if possible, in the spirit of amity to which I have adverted.* Lord Lyons has prudently refrained from opening the subject to me, as I presume, waiting instructions from home. We have done nothing on the subject to anticipate the discussion, and we have not furnished you with any explanations. We adhere to that course now, because we think it more prudent that the ground taken by the British government should be first made known to us here, and that the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here. It is proper, however, that you should know one fact in the case, without indicating that we attach much importance to it, namely, that, in the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board a British vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions from the government, the subject is therefore free from the embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been specially directed by us. *I trust that the British government will consider the subject in a friendly temper, and it may expect the best disposition on the part of this government.*

this was all which the principle he himself lays down required at the hands of the government. It was all the government could do with dignity and self-respect, before receiving notice of the ground taken by the government of Great Britain. At the very outset it disavowed the act, expressed the hope and belief that it need not interrupt the friendly relations of the two countries, and declared its readiness to receive the views of Great Britain, and to discuss them in a friendly spirit. What more would the gentleman from Ulster have had it do? What more could it have done, without being open to the suspicion of an undue eagerness to placate the British power, by branding as wrong an act which as an act of personal gallantry the whole country admired and applauded? The gentleman concedes that the act was wrong, and that we could properly have done, before the demand was made, precisely what we did afterwards. I put it to him whether we could properly or honorably have refused to do a just act, simply *because* it was demanded at our hands? Where is the humiliation of acceding to a just demand? Nay, Sir, if we had refused to do what we recognize as just and right, merely because the British government, in due form and without a word to which on grounds of courtesy just exception could be taken, had claimed it at our hands, would not the humiliation have been tenfold greater? Should we not have stood degraded and disgraced, at the bar of nations, by such a refusal?

Our government pursued the only course open to it on grounds of justice and self-respect. We did what was right, because it was right; and we have received for so doing the applause of the world. We maintained our own cherished principles on the subject of neutrality. We secured the adhesion to them of every leading power of Europe, England herself not excepted. We commanded the respect of the British government itself, and proved to it that we were strong enough to conquer, not only our enemies, but our prejudices and our resentments. Our history contains no brighter page than that. No government ever acted with a clearer devotion to the principles of justice and of right. No people on the face of the earth ever exhibited a nobler power of self-command,—a more high-toned devotion to the permanent welfare of the country, or a calmer superiority to the excited passions of the hour, than did our own on that

occasion. Posterity will honor them for it, even as the united voice of the leading nations of the world honors them for it to-day. Permit me, sir, to read some of the declarations of foreign powers upon this point.

First let me call the attention of this committee to the language held by M. Thouvenel, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a despatch dated December 3, written in advance of the action of our government upon the subject:

The Trent was not destined to a point belonging to one of the belligerents. She was carrying to a neutral country her cargo and her passengers; and, moreover, it was in a neutral port that they were taken. If it were admissible that, under such conditions, the neutral flag does not completely cover the persons and merchandise it carries, its immunity would be nothing more than an idle word; at any moment the commerce and the navigation of third powers would have to suffer from their innocent and even their indirect relations with the one or the other of the belligerents. These last would no longer find themselves as having only the right to exact from the neutral entire impartiality, and to interdict all intermeddling on his part in acts of hostility. They would impose, on his freedom of commerce and navigation, restrictions which modern international law has refused to admit as legitimate; and we should, in a word, fall back upon vexatious practices, against which, in other epochs, no power has more earnestly protested than the United States.

If the cabinet of Washington would only look on the two persons arrested as rebels, whom it is always lawful to seize, the question, to place it on other ground, could not be solved, however, in a sense in favor of the commander of the San Jacinto. There would be, in such case, misapprehension of the principle which makes a vessel a portion of the territory of the nation whose flag it bears, and violation of that immunity which prohibits a foreign sovereign, by consequence, from the exercise of his jurisdiction. It certainly is not necessary to recall to mind with what energy, under every circumstance, the government of the United States has maintained this immunity, and the right of asylum which is the consequence of it.

Not wishing to enter upon a more deep discussion of the questions raised by the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, I have said enough, I think, to settle the point that the cabinet of Washington could not, without striking a blow at the principles which all neutral nations are alike interested in holding in respect, nor without taking the attitude of contradiction of its own course up to this time, give its approbation to the proceedings of the commander of the San Jacinto. In this state of things it evidently should not, according to our views, hesitate about the determination to be taken.

Lord Lyons is already instructed to present the demand for satisfaction which the English cabinet is under the necessity of reducing to form, and which consists in the immediate release of the persons taken from on board the Trent, and in sending explanations which may take from this act its offensive character toward the British flag. The federal government will be inspired by a just and exulted feeling in referring to these requests. One would search in vain to what end, for what interest, it would hazard to provoke, by a different attitude, a rupture with Great Britain.

That, sir, is the voice of France, now one of the leading naval, as she has always been one of the leading military, powers of Europe; one, moreover, which has always seconded the efforts of the United States to enlarge the immunities of neutrals in time of war. The voice of Russia is equally explicit, and having been uttered after our compliance with the just demand of Great Britain, is still more pertinent. Let me

read a single paragraph from the dispatch of Prince Gorischakoff, dated Jan. 9, and written immediately on receiving intelligence of the action of our government:

I need not add, Monsieur, that in remaining faithful to the political principles which she has always defended, even when these principles were turned against herself, and in abstaining from taking advantage, in her turn, of doctrines which she had always repudiated, the American nation has given a proof of political honesty which will acquire for it an uncontested claim to the esteem and gratitude of all governments interested in seeing the peace of the seas maintained, and the principles of right prevail over force, in international relations, in the repose of the world, the progress of civilization, and the well-being of humanity.

His majesty the emperor is pleased to hope that the same wisdom and moderation which dictated to the Federal government its latest resolutions, will also direct its conduct during the continuance of those internal difficulties with which it finds itself engaged.

The emperor is persuaded that the statesmen who have shown themselves able to take such an elevated view of the foreign interests of their country, will also know how to make their internal policy superior to popular passion.

The government of the new Kingdom of Italy holds language equally decided upon the same subject, Baron RICASOLI, in a despatch dated January 24, after expressing the interest with which the government and people of Italy, although profoundly absorbed in their own affairs, have watched the progress of events in the United States, addressing the Chevalier Bertinatti, the Italian minister at Washington, proceeds to say:

" You are not ignorant, Mr. Minister, that the Royal Government has always been attached to the principles of the freedom of the seas. At the Congress of Paris it united with eagerness in the declaration of the 30th of April, 1856, and hoped that that declaration, as soon as it could have the assent of the United States of America, would, in time, become the point of departure for fresh progress in the practical operation of international law. Knowing the bold and persevering efforts which the Government at Washington had made for fifty years past, to defend the right of neutrals, we hesitated to believe that it desired to change its character all at once and become the champion of theories which history has shewn to be calamitous, and which public opinion has condemned forever.

" By continuing to remain attached to principles whose defence has constituted one of the causes of the glory of North America, Mr. LINCOLN and his Ministry have given an example of wisdom and moderation which will have the best results for America, as well as for the European nations."

I might quote largely, Sir, from English authorities to prove how profoundly this act of justice has impressed even the English people with respect for the wisdom and moderation which have marked the conduct of the President and Cabinet at Washington in this affair. Having some regard left, however, for the patience of the Committee, I shall content myself with this single paragraph from a recent number of *Frazer's Magazine*—a periodical of acknowledged position and influence:—

" I contend that all previous cause of offence should be considered as cancelled by the reparation which the American Government has so amply made; not so much

the reparation itself, which might have been so made as to leave still greater cause of permanent resentment behind it, but the manner and spirit in which they have made it. These have been such as most of us, I venture to say, did not by any means expect. If reparation were made at all, of which few we felt more than a hope, we thought that it would have been made obviously as a concession to prudence, not to principle. We expected that the atonement, if atonement there were, would have been made with reservations, perhaps under protest. We expected that the correspondence would have been spun out, and a trial made to induce England to be satisfied with less; or that there would have been a proposal of arbitration; or that England would have been asked to make concessions in return for justice; or that if submission was made, it would have been made, ostensibly, to the opinions and wishes of Continental Europe. We expected anything, in short, which would have been weak, and timid, and paltry. The only thing which no one seemed to expect is what has actually happened. Mr. LINCOLN'S Government has done none of these things. *Like honest men, they have said in direct terms that our demand is right; that they yielded to it because it was just; that if they themselves had received the same treatment they would have demanded the same reparation; and that if what seemed to be the American side of a question was not the just side, they would be on the side of justice; happy as they were to find, after their resolution had been taken, that it was also the side which America had formerly defended.* Is there any one, capable of a moral judgment or feeling, who will say that his opinion of America and American statesmen is not raised by such an act, done on such grounds? The act itself may have been imposed by the necessity of the circumstances, but the reasons given, the principles of action professed, were their own choice.

Are not these tributes worth something to us? Have we not gained something of permanent and substantial value, when we have thus secured the respect and esteem of all the leading powers of Christendom? Can there have been anything "humiliating" in an act which thus commands the unqualified and hearty applause of every great Christian nation? I ask my friend from Ulster, whether our position today on this subject is not infinitely better, in every respect,—on the score of national dignity, of national honor and of national interest,—than it would have been if we had yielded to the sentiment which he invokes, and refused, from a feeling of false pride, to make reparation for an acknowledged wrong, merely because it was demanded by a government which had earned no claim to courtesies at our hands?

One word, now, in regard to another of the instances in which our government is said to have been humiliated in its relations with Great Britain,—I speak of the permission given to march British troops, on their way to Canada, across the State of Maine. "This," says the gentleman from Ulster, "is in a spirit of meekness and humility that seldom characterises a people conscious of their abilities to maintain their rights and their dignity. Some gentlemen may characterise it as the law of kindness: I choose to characterise it as emanating from a sense of weakness."

I cannot concur in this view of the matter. Instead of emanating from a sense of weakness, sir, it seems to me to have indicated a consciousness of strength. We were strong enough to afford such an act of courtesy. If we had felt weak, distrustful of the designs of England, or of our own ability to meet them, we might have shrunk from such an act. But we had no such feeling. We were on terms of amity with Great Britain. She had disavowed any thought or purpose of hostility in sending troops to Canada. It was a happy inspiration which led the President or the Secretary of State to show England, by such a preferred courtesy, that we neither dreaded her power nor distrusted her friendship. It was a small favor: all it could possibly accomplish was to enable the troops to reach Canada some five days sooner, and with somewhat less of exposure and hardship, than they could otherwise have done. But it is with nations as in private life—small acts of kindness often go further than great acts to indicate a friendly temper—to disarm jealousies and conquer the prejudices and suspicions which implant needless distrust between neighbors and nations. "Magnanimity in politics," says BURKE, "is not seldom the truest wisdom, and a great empire and little minds go but ill together." I honor the government for its action in that affair. The State of Maine has expressed her hearty approval of it. The country and the world have seen in it an indication of conscious strength and of superiority to the petty jealousies and resentments of the hour.

Now, Sir, a word concerning the inquiries of England concerning the stone blockade. We have always insisted that a blockade, to be respected, must be effective. We protested against the course of England, when during the great war with France she attempted to blockade the entire French coast by proclamations and by Orders in Council, as we also protested against the attempt of Napoleon to retaliate by forbidding all neutral trade with England in the Berlin and Milan decrees. We have insisted that every blockade must be actual; and we have assumed the obligation of making our blockade of the Southern ports actual and effective, as the only condition on which we can demand that it shall be respected. In the prosecution of this purpose we have sunk stone boats at the mouth of Charleston harbor. Great Britain having, like

every other commercial nation, an interest in every harbor of the world, asked the object of that transaction. I think she had a right to do so; for harbors, in a very important sense, belong to no one nation as a *peculium*—a private and exclusive possession. They are the gift of God to the commerce of the world. They are intended to promote that intercourse of nations by which the civilization of the world is carried forward; and I think it very doubtful whether any nation, judged by the highest standards of international morality, has a right to destroy a harbor except under pressure of the direst necessity. At all events, sir, Great Britain had an undoubted right to inquire of our government with what object that stone fleet had been sunk at the mouth of Charleston harbor. Nothing is more common or more proper than such requests for explanation. It does not appear that any complaint was made. Lord LYONS informs his government that he had "spoken to Mr. SEWARD on the subject," and that Mr. SEWARD observed "that the plan had not been devised with a view to injure the harbor *permanently*; it was simply a temporary military measure to aid the blockade." That certainly was a very proper reply. I can see nothing in it of the "frittering admissions and humiliating concessions," which the gentleman from Ulster detects. Mr. SEWARD added that as had already been done at Port Royal the United States would open better harbors than they had closed. And serious exception is taken by my friend from Clinton (Mr. STETSON), to the remark of Lord Lyons in reply, that "the opening of a new port thirty or forty miles off would hardly console the people of Charleston for the destruction of their own harbor." I do not see that the remark was either very pertinent or very important. Lord LYONS was probably aware that it was no part of the object of our government just now to "console the people of Charleston" for any of the evils incident to the rebellion in which they are engaged.

Mr. STETSON: I only intended to say that this remark of Lord LYONS revealed the secret sympathy of the English with the rebels.

Mr. RAYMOND: Possibly it may have indicated the personal sympathy of Lord LYONS with the people of Charleston. I do not think it can fairly be held to warrant any broader or more important inference. Certainly it is not a mat-

ter to warrant hostile preparations or inspire fears or thoughts of war.

Mr. PIERCE: Do you admit the right of Great Britain to catechise us as to our own proceedings in regard to our own ports?

Mr. RAYMOND: I admit her right to ask explanations in a friendly way of any act on our part, concerning which there is fair room for doubt, and which may affect her interests hereafter. I think she had precisely the same right to ask the intent and meaning of our sinking a stone fleet at the mouth of Charleston harbor, as we had to ask the object of her sending troops to Canada.

Mr. PIERCE.—Does the gentleman mean to say that this is all that was intended by that letter of Lord LYONS?

Mr. RAYMOND.—I detect nothing else in it. I can see nothing in it beyond a common place, friendly call for explanations of a point concerning which there was room for doubt, and in which Great Britain had an important and a permanent interest.

Upon all these points, therefore, in the settlement of the Trent affair, in proffering permission for the passage of British troops across the State of Maine, and in the explanations asked and frankly given concerning the stone blockade, I see nothing whatever to warrant the statement of the gentleman from Ulster, that our government had been humiliated and disgraced. On the contrary, Sir, I hold that its honor has been rigidly and scrupulously guarded and maintained and that its highest and most enduring interests have been consulted, in everything that has been done by our government in these affairs.

Permit me here, Sir, to say, that in my humble judgment this State, this Nation and the world at large owe to the Secretary of State a debt of gratitude for his management of our foreign relations in this the most difficult crisis of our affairs. He has maintained our rights; he has protected our honor; he has secured our interests; he has preserved the peace of the world; he has brought to the discharge of the duties of his great office a degree of ability, a far-seeing statesmanship, a high-toned sense of what is just and right, and a paramount, exclusive devotion to the good of the country, seldom if ever surpassed in the history of any nation. New York has many names upon the records of the nation of which she may well be proud.

From the earliest period of our history to the present day, they illustrate that chapter which she contributes to our national history. Hamilton, Jay, Clinton, Tompkins, Marcy, Wright,—these are all names which make the State renowned; and among the best and brightest of them all, *primus inter pares*, future time will enrol, for his guidance of our ship of state under the tempests that now assail it, as well as for the general service he has rendered the country during a long public career unstained by reproach and marked by the most brilliant deeds, the name of WILLIAM H. SEWARD [applause]. I say this, Sir, with the more freedom now because, by his own act, his name is henceforth removed entirely from the field of political controversy.

I have finished what I had to say of the causes which are supposed to render doubtful, at least uncertain, the continuance of our peaceful relations with Great Britain. I have examined each count in the indictment with more of detail, perhaps, than was necessary,—certainly with a more serious draft than I could have wished upon the patience of the committee. And what is there left? What remains of all the grounds alleged for apprehended war? Nothing, Sir,—nothing whatever beyond the angry recriminations of the newspaper press, and the general distrust and uneasy petulance of a large and noisy portion of the people of both countries. I would not underrate the importance and influence even of these indications. They charge the atmosphere with elements of danger. They lay the foundation for future trouble doubtless, by rendering more difficult the peaceful solution of controversies that may arise between the two nations. But they only thus make a little more difficult the task of statesmanship; they do not by any means render it impossible. It is for men in public place to allay these angry discontents that have no just foundation,—not to increase them. It is the duty of men charged with the conduct of public affairs, or placed in positions of public influence, to smooth all these asperities, to calm these resentments, and to bring the public mind to consult only what is just and right and befitting the character and the welfare of a great nation.

I have left myself but little time to speak of the subject referred to by the gentleman from Yates [Mr. OGDEN], the interference of Spain, France and England, in the affairs of Mexico; and yet I cannot pass it wholly without notice. It is by

no means free from difficulty or from danger to the public peace. I cannot help thinking that we have ourselves, in very great degree, to blame for having lost control of its management and direction. Mexico invited us some years ago to exercise a *quasi* protectorate over her; and in the treaty which she concluded with Mr. McLANE tendered to us a degree of influence which would have saved her and us from the complications which threaten both. We rejected the offer. The Senate refused to ratify the treaty. Mexico was allowed to drift on into increasing anarchy, and to commit, for lack of steady control and timely aid to the government which would have exercised it, those outrages and indiscretions which have brought upon her the intervention of foreign powers.

Those powers, it is but just to remember, have been impelled by different motives in the action they have taken. Spain's motive is, beyond all doubt, ambition—the ambition to figure again as a first rate power and possibly to regain some of her old possessions. But France and England had substantial wrongs to redress—outrages upon their subjects to punish, and security for their interests to gain hereafter. That they will ever agree in the policy of forcing MAXIMILIAN, or any other foreign prince upon the throne of Mexico, I very greatly doubt. That project seems to have been concocted, not in either of the three countries concerned, nor even in Austria. So far as we can get any reliable evidence of its origin, it seems to have been one of the many intrigues by which the expelled agents and emissaries in Europe of the defeated Church and Monarchical party in Mexico, seek to regain power and drive the liberals from office. This seems highly probable in the first place from the correspondence which has passed between the English and French governments upon the subject. As soon as the scheme was broached in the European journals, Earl COWLEY, under date of January 24, wrote to the English Minister, as follows:

PARIS, Jan. 24, 1862.

I have heard from so many quarters that the language of officers going with the reinforcements to Mexico is, that it is for the purpose of placing the Archduke Maximilian upon the throne of that country, that I have thought it necessary to question M. Thouvenel upon the subject.

I inquired of M. Thouvenel whether any negotiations had been pending between the government and that of Austria, with reference to the Archduke Maximilian. His excellency replied in the negative. *He said that the negotiations had been carried on by Mexicans only, who had come over for the purpose and gone to Vienna.*

The English government lost no time in warning the parties concerned against the prosecution

of such a purpose. In a letter dated January 19th, Earl RUSSELL directed the British Minister, at Madrid, to make suitable representations to the Spanish government upon the subject. I quote a paragraph from that despatch :

I wish you to read to Marshall O'Donnell and M. Calderon Collantes the preamble and the article of our convention, which define what our intervention is intended to do and what it is not intended to do.

You will point out that the allied forces are not to be used for the purpose of depriving the Mexicans of their undoubted right of choosing their own form of government.

Should the Mexicans choose to constitute a new government, which can restore order and preserve amicable relations with foreign nations, her Majesty's government will be delighted to hail the formation, and to support the consolidation of such a government. If, on the contrary, the troops of foreign Powers are to be used to set up a government repugnant to the sentiments of Mexico, and to support it by military force, her Majesty's government could expect no other result from such an attempt than discord and disappointment. In such a case the allied governments could only have to choose between withdrawing from such an enterprise with some shame, or extending their interference beyond the limits, scope and intention of the triple convention.

And in a despatch, dated January 27, Earl Russell thus writes to Sir C. Wyke, the British Minister in Mexico, on the same point :—

"It is said that the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian will be invited by a large body of Mexicans to place himself on the throne of Mexico, and that the Mexican people will gladly hail such a change.

I have little to add to my former instructions on this head. If the Mexican people, by a spontaneous movement, place the Austrian Archduke on the throne of Mexico there is nothing in the convention to prevent it.

"On the other hand, we would be no parties to a forcible intervention for this purpose. The Mexicans must consult their own interests"

This language leaves little room to doubt that England does not intend to become a party to any scheme for forcing a monarchical form of government upon the people of Mexico, or for placing any European prince at the head of its government. Most assuredly, in my judgment, she will not engage in any such intrigue if she thereby incurs one chance in a hundred, to use the language of my friend from Ulster, of war with the United States.

There are indications also that the Emperor of the French will take the same ground. A letter from the Paris correspondent of the New York Times, whom I know personally to be likely, from his position and character, to be well informed on such a subject, states that so far as the Emperor has lent his encouragement to the scheme at all, it has been in consequence of the misrepresentations of the Mexican emissaries already referred to. I read a single sentence from his letter, which I find in the Times of this morning :

These misrepresentations of the Mexican monarchical agents have led the French Government into an er-

ror, and, there is reason to believe, have disgusted them with the whole enterprise. When the first expedition started, it was believed that the Monarchical Party, headed by ALMONTE and MIRAMON, was so powerful that the combined forces had but to show themselves, and the thing would be decided without striking a blow. Subsequent intelligence, obtained principally from M. MERCIER, at Washington, disabused the mind of the Emperor on this head, but he was then so far engaged in the affair that he was obliged to carry it through, cost what it may. It was then that he ordered forward the late large reinforcements, and gave orders for a reserve force which will follow, if required. The unanimity with which the Mexicans are uniting to defend their country from foreign invasion, did not create astonishment in England, but it did in France. The Emperor is now reduced to his first programme, that of seeking the money that is due to France, leaving the monarchical programme to take care of itself.

These blunders have naturally produced dissatisfaction in France, and make the people and the Government wish they were well out of the enterprise. The occasion is a good one for the mediation of the Government of the United States.

This last paragraph hints at what may, after all, be the solution of the whole affair. At all events, the project does not seem to me to involve any special danger to the honor or interests of the United States. It seems altogether probable that if seriously pushed it will dissolve the coalition. Certainly it can not, upon any ordinary estimate of chances, be regarded as likely to involve us in war.

One word more, sir, and I will relieve the patience of the committee. The gentleman from Ulster (Mr. PIERCE), wished to know whether we had asked ourselves the question, what is to become of the six hundred thousand men now in arms in behalf of the Union, after the Union is established and the insurrection is ended? Are they, said he, to return to the plow and the anvil, to the workshop and the factory, and settle down there again quiet and contented? He feared they would not, and that we should have here the material which we should find it necessary to employ in redressing the wrongs we have sustained from foreign powers. Even if this were all true, I do not see, sir, that it affords any reason why New York should appropriate five millions of dollars to arm herself in instant preparation for a foreign war. But let me remind the gentleman of some considerations which it is desirable not to lose sight of in this connection. Our armies are not made up, like the standing armies of Europe, of mercenaries who make their living by war, and who need this employment to keep them from starvation. They are men who have left their ordinary avocations to deliver their country from a temporary peril. Two-thirds of them have homes and occupations, wives and children, or parents and

friends. They have roof-trees and hearth-stones, to which their hearts turn with loving affection, even amid the exciting clamors of the camp. When they shall be released from the service of their country, the great mass of them will return to the pursuits of peace, and love them all the more for their brief absence from them. Not all our troops, I admit, are of this stamp. There will be scores and perhaps hundreds of thousands of them who are soldiers for the sake of adventure and who will miss the excitement which makes the camp attractive. But are these men to control the policy and decide the fate of the nation? Are we to shape our public action to the supposed necessities of such men? Certainly not. They will find ample fields for their adventurous disposition without plunging the country into foreign wars for its gratification. Thousands of them will remain in the section they are now invading and devote their energies to reclaiming its soil, to reinvigorating its industry, to modifying its institutions, and giving to it a new face and a nobler fate. Those for whom such pursuits shall be too tame, will drift off still further southward, into Mexico or South America, where the condition of society is better suited to their wants, and where they will find abundant means to gratify their love of adventure.

We may have disturbances and difficulties, more or less serious, from this source. We shall need wisdom and calm sagacity on the part of our public rulers, to enable us to deal wisely with such tempers. We shall need in our public councils men who seek place only that they may

therein serve the country—not men who seek it for selfish ends, by flattery of public passions and by pandering to the base and ignoble aims of vulgar men. But with such men in power, (and the temper of the times is favorable to their selection), I apprehend no serious difficulty in dealing with the apprehended evil to which my friend alludes. Doubtless there is danger, more or less menacing, from the predominance of the military temper and spirit which war evokes—and one of my strongest objections to this bill is, that it encourages that spirit, and addresses itself to the popular feeling which it creates.

For these reasons, sir—and I thank the committee for the patience with which they have heard me state them—I oppose the passage of this bill “providing for the public defence.” I know of no emergency that calls for its enactment. I know of no impending danger that calls upon this state to expend five millions of dollars in forts and guns and munitions of war, and in adding thus largely to the burdens which the war-tax will impose upon her people. I do not believe all taxation to be an evil. When properly distributed and wisely applied, like the moisture which ascends from the earth only to fall again with blessing upon its bosom, it improves and stimulates to still higher productiveness the very sources from which it is drawn. But taxation which dries up the very sources of revenue becomes a heavy and a fatal curse. Let us not be impatient to outrun the necessities of the time, nor eager to trespass, without some imperative necessity, upon the functions and prerogatives of the General Government.

